ABSTRACT. We investigate a generalisation of the coherent choice functions considered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) , by sticking to the convexity axiom but imposing no Archimedeanity condition. We define our choice functions on vector spaces of options, which allows us to incorporate as special cases both Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) choice functions on horse lotteries and sets of desirable gambles (Quaeghebeur, 2014) , and to investigate their connections.
INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of the seminal work of Arrow (1951) and Uzawa (1956) , coherent choice functions have been used widely as a model of the rational behaviour of an individual or a group. In particular, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) established an axiomatisation of coherent choice functions, generalising Rubin's (1987) axioms to allow for incomparability. Under this axiomatisation, they proved a representation theorem for coherent choice functions in terms of probability-utility pairs: a choice function C satisfies their coherence axioms if and only if there is some non-empty set S of probability-utility pairs such that f ∈ C(A) whenever the option f maximises p-expected u-utility over the set of options A for some (p,u) in S.
Allowing for incomparability between options may often be of crucial importance. Faced with a choice between two options, a subject may not have enough information to establish a (strict or weak) preference of one over the other: the two options may be incomparable. This will indeed typically be the case when the available information is too vague or limited. It arises quite intuitively for group decisions, but also for decisions made by a single subject, as was discussed quite thoroughly by , Levi (1980) , and Walley (1991) , amongst many others. Allowing for incomparability lies at the basis of a generalising approach to probability theory that is often referred to by the term imprecise probabilities. It unifies a diversity of well-known uncertainty models, including typically non-linear (or non-additive) functionals, credal sets, and sets of desirable gambles; see the introductory book by Augustin et al. (2014) for a recent overview. Among these, coherent sets of desirable gambles, as discussed by Quaeghebeur (2014) , are usually considered to constitute the most general and powerful type of model. Such sets collect the gambles that a given subject considers strictly preferable to the status quo.
Nevertheless, choice functions clearly lead to a still more general model than sets of desirable gambles, because the former's preferences are not necessarily completely determined by the pair-wise comparisons between options that essentially constitute the latter. This was of course already implicit in Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) work, but was investigated in detail in one of our recent papers (Van Camp et al., 2017) , where we zoomed in on the connections between choice functions, sets of desirable gambles, and indifference.
In order to explore the connection between indifference and the strict preference expressed by choice functions, we extended the above-mentioned axiomatisation by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) to choice functions defined on vector spaces of options, rather than convex sets of horse lotteries, and also let go of two of their axioms: (i) the Archimedean one, because it prevents choice functions from modelling the typically nonArchimedean preferences captured by coherent sets of desirable gambles; and (ii) the convexity axiom, because it turns out to be hard to reconcile with Walley-Sen maximality as a decision rule, something that is closely tied in with coherent sets of desirable options (Troffaes, 2007) . Although our alternative axiomatisation allows for more leeway, and for an easy comparison with the existing theory of sets of desirable gambles, it also has the drawback of no longer forcing a Rubinesque representation theorem, or in other words, of not leading to a strong belief structure (De Cooman, 2005) . Such a representation is nevertheless interesting, because it allows choice functions to be constructed using basic building blocks. In an earlier paper (Van Camp et al., 2017) , we did discuss a few interesting examples of special 'representable' choice functions, such as the ones from a coherent set of desirable gambles via maximality, or those determined by a set of probability measures via E-admissibility.
The goal of the present paper is twofold: to (i) further explore the connection of our definition of choice functions with Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) ; and to (ii) investigate in detail the implications of Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) convexity axiom in our context. We will prove that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, for those choice functions that are uniquely determined by binary comparisons, convexity is equivalent to being representable by means of a lexicographic probability measure. This is done by first establishing the implications of convexity in terms of the binary comparisons associated with a choice function, giving rise to what we will call lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. These sets include as particular cases the so-called maximal and strictly desirable sets of desirable gambles. Although in the particular case of binary possibility spaces these are the only two possibilities, for more general spaces lexicographic sets of gambles allow for a greater level of generality, as one would expect considering the above-mentioned equivalence.
A consequence of our equivalence result is that we can consider infima of choice functions associated with lexicographic probability measures, and in this manner subsume the examples of E-admissibility and M-admissibility discussed in an earlier paper (Van Camp et al., 2017) . It will follow from the discussion that these infima also satisfy the convexity axiom. As one particularly relevant application of these ideas, we prove that the most conservative convex choice function associated with a binary preference relation can be obtained as the infimum of its dominating lexicographic choice functions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall the basics of coherent choice functions on vector spaces of options as introduced in our earlier work (Van Camp et al., 2015) . We motivate our definitions by showing in Section 3 that they include in particular coherent choice functions on horse lotteries, considered by Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) , and we discuss in some detail the connection between the rationality axioms considered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) and ours.
As a particularly useful example, we discuss in Section 4 the choice functions that are determined by binary comparisons. We have already shown before (Van Camp et al., 2017) that this leads to the model of coherent sets of desirable gambles; here we study the implications of including convexity as a rationality axiom.
In Section 5, we motivate our definition of lexicographic choice functions and study the properties of their associated binary preferences. We prove the connection with lexicographic probability systems and show that the infima of such choice functions can be used when we want to determine the implications of imposing convexity and maximality. We conclude with some additional discussion in Section 6.
COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON VECTOR SPACES
Consider a real vector space V provided with the vector addition + and scalar multiplication. We denote the additive identity by 0. For any subsets A 1 and A 2 of V and any λ in R, we let λA 1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈ A 1 } and A 1 + A 2 ∶= {u + v ∶ u ∈ A 1 and v ∈ A 2 }.
Elements of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst which a subject can express his preferences, by specifying choice functions. Often, options will be real-valued maps on some possibility space, interpreted as uncertain rewards-and therefore also called gambles. More generally, they can be vector-valued gambles: vectorvalued maps on the possibility space. We will see further on that by using such vectorvalued gambles, we are able to include as a special case horse lotteries, the options considered for instance by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) . Also, we have shown (Van Camp et al., 2017) that indifference for choice functions can be studied efficiently by also allowing equivalence classes of indifferent gambles as options; these yet again constitute a vector space, where now the vectors cannot always be identified easily with maps on some possibility space, or gambles. For these reasons, we allow in general any real vector space to serve as an our set of (abstract) possible options. We will call such a real vector space an option space.
We denote by Q(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets of V, a strict subset of the power set of V. When it is clear what option space V we are considering, we will also use the simpler notation Q. Elements A of Q are the option sets amongst which a subject can choose his preferred options.
Definition 1.
A choice function C on an option space V is a map
We collect all the choice functions on V in C(V), often denoted as C when it is clear from the context what the option space is.
The idea underlying this simple definition is that a choice function C selects the set C(A) of 'best' options in the option set A. Our definition resembles the one commonly used in the literature (Aizerman, 1985; Seidenfeld et al., 2010; Sen, 1977) , except perhaps for an also not entirely unusual restriction to finite option sets (He, 2012; Schwartz, 1972; Sen, 1971) .
Equivalently to a choice function C, we may consider its associated rejection func-
Another equivalent notion is that of a choice relation. Indeed, for any choice function C-and therefore for any rejection function R-the associated choice relation is the binary relation ⊲ on Q (Seidenfeld et al., 2010 , Section 3), defined by:
(1)
The intuition behind ⊲ is clear: A 1 ⊲ A 2 whenever every option in A 1 is rejected when presented with the options in A 1 ∪ A 2 .
2.1. Useful basic definitions and notation. We call N the set of all (positive) integers, R >0 the set of all (strictly) positive real numbers, and R ≥0 ∶= R >0 ∪ {0}.
Given any subset A of an option space V, we define its positive hull posi(A) as the set of all positive finite linear combinations of elements of A:
and its convex hull CH(A) as the set of convex combinations of elements of A:
With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V, we can associate an ordering ⪯ K on V, defined for all u and v in V as follows:
We also write u ⪰ K v for v ⪯ K u. The ordering ⪯ K is actually a vector ordering: it is a partial order-reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive-that satisfies the following two characteristic properties:
for all u 1 , u 2 and v in V, and all λ in R >0 . Observe, by the way, that as a consequence
Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper convex cone K from which it is derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}. When the abstract options are gambles, ⪯ will typically be the point-wise order ≤, but it need not necessarily be.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial ordering ≺ as follows:
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex cone V ≻0 ∶= K ∖ {0}.
From now on, we assume that V is an ordered vector space, with a generic but fixed vector ordering ⪯ K . We will refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper convex cone K we are using, and simply write V to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ as a generic notation for the associated vector ordering.
2.2. Rationality axioms. We focus on a special class of choice functions, which we will call coherent. Definition 2. We call a choice function C on V coherent if for all A, A 1 and A 2 in Q, all u and v in V, and all λ in R >0 :
We collect all the coherent choice functions on V inC(V), often denoted asC when it is clear from the context what the option space is.
Parts C 3 a and C 3 b of Axiom C 3 are respectively known as Sen's condition α and Aizerman's condition. They are more commonly written in terms of the rejection function as, respectively:
and
These axioms constitute a subset of the ones introduced by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) , duly translated from horse lotteries to our abstract options, which are more general as we will show in Section 3 further on. In this respect, our notion of coherence is less restrictive than theirs. On the other hand, our Axiom C 2 is more restrictive the corresponding one in Seidenfeld et al. (2010) . This is necessary for the link between coherent choice functions and coherent sets of desirable gambles we will establish in Section 4.
One axiom we omit from our coherence definition, is the Archimedean one. Typically the preference associated with coherent sets of desirable gambles does not have the Archimedean property (Zaffalon and Miranda, 2015 , Section 3), so letting go of this axiom is necessary if we want to explore the connection with desirability.
The second axiom that we do not consider as necessary for coherence is what we will call the convexity axiom:
As we will show in Section 4, it is incompatible with Walley-Sen maximality (Walley, 1991; Troffaes, 2007) as a decision rule. Nevertheless, we intend to investigate the connection with desirability for coherent choice functions that do satisfy the convexity axiom.
Two dominance properties are immediate consequences of coherence: Proposition 1. Let C be a coherent choice function on Q. Then for all u 1 and u 2 in V such that u 1 ⪯ u 2 , all A in Q and all v in A ∖ {u 1 , u 2 }:
Proof. The result is trivial when u 1 = u 2 , so let us assume that u 1 ≺ u 2 . The first statement is again trivial if u 1 ∈ A. When u 1 ∉ A, it follows from Axiom C 2 that u 1 ∉ C({u 1 , u 2 }). By applying Axiom C 3 a in the form of Equation (4), we find that u 1 ∉ C(A ∪ {u 1 }), and then applying Axiom C 3 b in the form of Equation (5), together with the assumption that v ∉ C(A ∪ {u 1 }), we conclude that v ∉ C(A ∪ {u 1 } ∖ {u 1 }) =
C(A).
For the second statement, it follows from Axiom C 2 that u 1 ∉ C({u 1 , u 2 }). By applying Axiom C 3 a in the form of Equation (4), we find that both u 1 ∉ C(A ∪ {u 2 }) and v ∉ C(A ∪ {u 2 }), so we can apply Axiom C 3 b in the form of Equation (5) 
We are interested in conservative reasoning with choice functions. We therefore introduce a binary relation ⊑ on the set C of all choice functions, having the interpretation of 'not more informative than', or, in other words, 'at least as uninformative as'. Definition 3. Given two choice functions C 1 and C 2 in C, we call C 1 not more informative than C 2 -and we write
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used by Bradley (2015, Section 2) and Van Camp et al. (2017, Definition 6) . The underlying idea is that a choice function is more informative when it consistently chooses more specifically-or more restrictivelyamongst the available options.
Since, by definition, ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions, the following result is immediate (Davey and Priestley, 1990) .
Proposition 2. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑ on C is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
(ii) for any subset C ′ of C, its infimum inf C ′ and its supremum sup C ′ with respect to the ordering ⊑ exist in C, and are given by inf C
The idea underlying these notions of infimum and supremum is that inf C ′ is the most informative model that is not more informative than any of the models in C ′ , and sup C ′ the least informative model that is not less informative than any of the models in C ′ .
We have proved elsewhere (Van Camp et al., 2017 , Proposition 3) that coherence is preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima. Because of our interest in the additional Axiom C 5 , we prove that it also is preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima.
Proposition 3. Given any non-empty collection C ′ of choice functions that satisfy Axiom C 5 , its infimum inf C ′ satisfies Axiom C 5 as well.
THE CONNECTION WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Before we go on with our exploration of choice functions, let us take some time here to explain why we have chosen to define them in the way we did. Seidenfeld et al. (2010) (see also Kadane et al., 2004) define choice functions on horse lotteries, instead of options, as this helps them generalise the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) for binary preferences to non-binary ones.
One reason for our working with the more abstract notion of options-elements of some general vector space-is that they are better suited for dealing with indifference: this involves working with equivalence classes of options, which again constitute a vector space (Van Camp et al., 2017) . These equivalence classes can no longer be interpreted easily or directly as gambles, or horse lotteries for that matter. Another reason for using options that are more general than real-valued gambles is that recent work by Zaffalon and Miranda (2015) has shown that a very general theory of binary preference can be constructed using vector-valued gambles, rather than horse lotteries. Such vector-valued gambles again constitute a real vector, or option, space. Here, we show that the conclusions of their work can be extended from binary preferences to choice functions.
We consider an arbitrary possibility space X of mutually exclusive elementary events, one of which is guaranteed to occur. Consider also a countable set R of prizes, or rewards.
Definition 4 (Gambles). Any bounded real-valued function on some domain X is called a gamble on X . We collect all gambles on X in L(X ), often denoted as L when it is clear from the context what the domain X is.
When the domain is of the type X ×R, we call elements f of L(X ×R) vector-valued gambles on X . Indeed, for each x in X , the partial map f (x,⋅) is then an element of the vector space L(R).
The set L, provided with the point-wise addition of gambles, the point-wise multiplication with real scalars, and the point-wise vector ordering ≤, constitutes an ordered vector space. We call L >0 ∶= {f ∈ L ∶ f > 0} = {f ∈ L ∶ f ≥ 0 and f ≠ 0} the set of all positive (vector-valued) gambles.
Horse lotteries are special vector-valued gambles.
Definition 5 (Horse lotteries). We call horse lottery H any map from X ×R to [0,1] such that for all x in X , the partial map H(x, ⋅) is a probability mass function over R:
H(x, r ) = 1 and (∀r ∈ R)H(x,r ) ≥ 0 .
We collect all the horse lotteries on X with reward set R in H(X , R), which is also denoted more simply by H when it is clear from the context what the possibility space X and reward set R are.
Let us, for the remainder of this section, fix X and R. It is clear that H ⊆ L(X × R). Seidenfeld et al. (2010) consider choice functions whose domain is Q(H), the set of all finite subsets of H-choice functions on horse lotteries. 1 We will call them choice functions on H. Because of the nature of H, their choice functions are different from ours: they require slightly different rationality axioms. The most significant change is that for Seidenfeld et al. (2010) , choice functions need not satisfy Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b. In fact, choice functions on H cannot satisfy these axioms, since H is no linear space: it is not closed under arbitrary linear combinations, only under convex combinations. Instead, on their approach a choice function C * on H is required to satisfy
The binary relation ⊲ C * is the choice relation associated with C * , defined by Equation (1).
Furthermore, for a choice function C * to be coherent, it needs to additionally satisfy (see (Seidenfeld et al., 2010) ): 
where Seidenfeld et al. (2010) assume that there is a a unique worst reward and a unique best reward ⊺ in R. This is a somewhat stronger assumption than we will make:
further on in this section, we will only assume that there is a unique worst reward. Axiom C * 2 is the counterpart of Proposition 1 for choice functions on horse lotteries, which is a result of our Axioms C 1 -C 4 . Seidenfeld et al. (2010) need to impose this property as an axiom, essentially because of the absence in their system of a counterpart for our Axiom C 2 . Axioms C * 6 a and C * 6 b are Archimedean axioms, hard to reconcile with desirability (see for instance Zaffalon and Miranda, 2015, Section 4) , which is why will not enforce them here.
We now intend to show that under very weak conditions on the rewards set R, choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy C * 4 are in a one-to-one correspondence with choice functions on a suitably defined option space that satisfy Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b.
1 Actually, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) define choice functions on a larger domain: all possibly infinite but closed sets of horse lotteries (non-closed sets may not have admissible options). This is a complication we see no need for in the present context. Let us first study the impact of Axiom C * 4 . We begin by showing that an assessment of 
Proof. Fix A * and A * ′ in Q(H), H in A * and H ′ in A * ′ , λ and λ ′ in R >0 , and assume
). We infer from the assumption that
If we call α ∶= λ λ+λ ′ to ease the notation along, then 1 − α = λ ′ λ+λ ′ and α ∈ (0,1). We now infer from the identity above that αA
Consider the following chain of equivalences:
by Equation (1)
by Equation (1).
For any r in R, we now introduce R r ∶= R ∖ {r }, the set of all rewards without r . For the connection between choice functions on H and choice functions on some option space, we need to somehow be able to extend H to a linear space. The so-called gamblifier ϕ r will play a crucial role in this:
Definition 6 (Gamblifier ϕ r ). Consider any r in R. The gamblifier ϕ r is the linear map
In particular, the gamblifier ϕ r maps any horse lottery H in H(X , R) to an element ϕ r H of L(X × R r ) that satisfies the following two conditions: 
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any H and H ′ in H, and assume that ϕ r (H) = ϕ r (H ′ ). We infer from Definition 6 that
for all x in X and s in R r , and therefore also, since H and H ′ are horse lotteries,
The direct implication in the second statement is trivial; let us prove the converse.
. We may write, without loss of
. It follows from the assumption that there is at least one such j . The proof is complete if we can show that
. By Definition 6, we already know that 
We now lift the gamblifier ϕ r to a mapφ r that turns choice functions on gambles into choice functions on horse lotteries:
This definition makes sense because we have proved in Lemma 5 that ϕ r is one-to-one on H, and therefore invertible on ϕ r H. The result of applyingφ r to a choice function C on L(X × R r ) is a choice functionφ r C on H(X , R). Observe that we can equally well makeφ r apply to rejection functions R, and that for every A * in Q(H(X , R)):
soφ r R is the rejection function associated with the choice functionφ r C, when R is the rejection function for C. One property of the transformationφ r that will be useful in our subsequent proofs is the following: Lemma 6. Consider any r in R and any A in Q(L(X × R r )), and define g by g (x, s) ∶=
Proof. Consider any h in A + {g }, and let us show that 1 λ h satisfies the conditions in Equation (6). The first one is satisfied because λ > 0 and Proof. Assume ex absurdo thatφ r is not one-to-one, so there are choice functions C and C ′ on L(X ×R r ) that satisfy Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, such thatφ r C =φ r C ′ but nevertheless
If we now apply Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b we find
Specifying a choice function C * on H induces a strict preference relation on the reward set, as follows. With any reward r in R we can associate the constant and degenerate lottery H r by letting
for all x in X and s in R.
This is the lottery that associates the certain reward r with all states. Then a reward r is strictly preferred to a reward s when H s ∈ R * ({H r , H s }).
Definition 7 (C * has worst reward r ). Consider any reward r in R, and any choice function C * on H(X , R). We say that C * has worst reward r if r is the unique reward in R for which H r ∈ R * ({H,
The notion of having worst reward is closely related with what would be the natural translation of Axiom C 2 to choice functions
for some r in R, then we say that C * satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r . (9)) if and only ifφ r C has worst reward r .
Proposition 8. Consider any r in R and any choice function C on L(X ×R r ). Thenφ r C satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r (Equation
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any H in H(X , R) ∖ {H r }. Then H r (⋅, s) = 0 ≤ H(⋅, s) for all s in R r , and also H ≠ H r , whence indeed H r ∈φ r R({H, H r }), because by assumptionφ r C satisfies Equation (9) for r .
For the converse implication, consider any H 1 and
Observe that for the horse lottery H
Becauseφ r C is assumed to have worst reward r , we know that in particular H r ∈φ r R({H ′ , H r }), so we infer from Equation (7) 
Applying the liftingφ r furthermore preserves coherence: Proof. For the direct implication of (i), assume that C satisfies Axiom C 1 . Consider any
For the converse implication, assume thatφ r C satisfies Axiom C *
. Applying Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b and the definition ofφ [Equation (7)], we infer that indeed
For the direct implication of (ii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C 2 . Consider any H 1 and H 2 in H(X , R) such that H 1 ≠ H 2 and H 1 (⋅, s) ≤ H 2 (⋅, s) for all s in R r . Then ϕ r H 1 < ϕ r H 2 , so Axiom C 2 guarantees that ϕ r H 1 ∈ R({ϕ r H 1 , ϕ r H 2 }). Equation (7) now turns this into H 1 ∈φ r R({H 1 , H 2 }). Proposition 8 now tells us thatφ r C has worst reward r .
For the converse implication, assume thatφ r C has worst reward r . Consider any
ing the assumption thatφ r C has worst reward r , we find that then H r ∈φ r R({H r , H}). As a consequence, by Equation (7), we find that 0 = ϕ r H r ∈ R({0, ϕ r H}) = R(0,
Using Axiom C 4 a we infer that 0 ∈ R({0, f 2 − f 1 }), and using Axiom C 4 b that indeed
For the direct implication of (iii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C 3 a. Consider any A * , A * 1 and A * 2 in Q(H(X , R)) and assume that A * 1 ⊆φ r R(A 2 * ) and A * 2 ⊆ A * . Then
2 ) by Equation (7), and ϕ r A *
) by Equation (7).
For the converse implication, assume thatφ r C satisfies Axiom C * 3 a. Consider any A,
Analogously, we find that
Using Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, we infer from the assumptions that
2 ). Equation (7) then yields that A * 1 ⊆φ r R(A * 2 ). As a result, using Axiom C * 3 a, A * 1 ⊆φ r R(A * ), which, again applying Equation (7), results in
, and as a consequence, by Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, we find eventually that indeed A 1 ⊆ R(A).
For the direct implication of (iv), assume that C satisfies Axiom C 3 b. Consider any A * , A * 1 and A * 2 in Q(H(X , R)) and assume that A *
For the converse implication, assume thatφ r C satisfies Axiom C * 3 b. Consider any A, ). Again applying Equation (7) results in
and as a consequence, by Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, we find eventually that indeed
For (v), consider any A * 1 and A * 2 in Q(H(X , R)), any H in H(X , R), and any α in (0,1] . Consider the following chain of equivalences
by Equation (7) ⇔ ϕ r αA *
by Equation (7) ⇔ (αA
by Equation (1), which tells us thatφ r C satisfies Axiom C *
.
For the direct implication of (vi), assume that C satisfies Axiom C 5 . Consider any A * and A * 1 in Q(H(X , R)) and assume that
by Axiom C 5 . Use Equation (7) to infer that
For the converse implication, assume thatφ r C satisfies Axiom C * 5 . Consider any A and A 1 in Q(L(X × R r )) and assume that A ⊆ A 1 ⊆ CH(A). Use Lemma 6 to find λ in
and analogously, 
by Axioms C 4 a and C 4 b, results in C(A) ⊆ C(A 1 ).
We conclude that our discussion of choice functions on linear spaces subsumes the treatment of choice functions on horse lotteries satisfying Axiom C * 4 . Using the connections established above, all the results that we will prove later on are also applicable to choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy the corresponding rationality axioms.
THE LINK WITH DESIRABILITY
Van Camp et al. (2017) have studied in some detail how the coherent choice functions in the sense of Definition 2 can be related to coherent sets of desirable options (gambles). As an example, given a coherent set of desirable options D , the choice function that identifies the undominated-under the preference relation induced by Doptions, is coherent. This choice rule is called maximality (see Equation (12) further on). There are other rules that induce coherent choice functions, such as E-admissibilitythose choice functions identify the options whose (precise) expectation is maximal for at least one probability mass function in the credal set induced by D . Since we have shown in earlier work (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 13 ) that maximality leads to the most conservative coherent choice function that reflects the binary choices represented by D (see also Bradley, 2015 , Theorem 3), we focus on maximality as the connection between desirability and choice functions. Here, we investigate what remains of this connection when we require in addition that our choice functions should satisfy Axiom C 5 .
We recall that a set of desirable options is simply a subset of the vector space V. The underlying idea is that a subject strictly prefers each option in this set to the status quo 0. As for choice functions, we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable options.
Definition 8. A set of desirable options
We collect all coherent sets of desirable options in the setD.
More details can be found in a number of papers and books (Walley, 1991 (Walley, , 2000 Moral, 2005; Miranda and Zaffalon, 2010; Couso and Moral, 2011; de Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2012; de Cooman and Miranda, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2014; De Bock and de Cooman, 2015) .
Axioms D 3 and D 4 guarantee that a coherent D is a convex cone. This convex cone induces a strict partial order D on V, by letting
so D = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 D u} (de Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2014) . D and D are mathematically equivalent: given one of D or D , we can determine the other unequivocally using the formulas above. When it is clear from the context which set of desirable options D we are working with, we often refrain from mentioning the explicit reference to D in D and then we simply write . Coherence for sets of desirable options transfers to binary relations as follows: must be a strict partial ordermeaning that it is irreflexive and transitive-such that ≺ ⊆ , and must satisfy the two characteristic properties of Equations (2) and (3). What is the relationship between choice functions and sets of desirable options? Since we have just seen that sets of desirable options represent binary preferences, we see that we can associate a set of desirable options D C with every given choice function C by focusing on its binary choices: 
It selects all options from A that are undominated, or maximal, under the ordering D , or in other words, it is the corresponding choice function based on Walley-Sen maximality. This C D is easy to characterise:
Proposition 10. Given any coherent set of desirable options D , then
Proof. By Equation (12) 
This proposition seems to indicate that there is something special about coherent sets of desirable options whose complement is a convex cone too. We give them a special name that will be motivated and explained in the next section. We collect all the lexicographic coherent sets of desirable options inD L .
Another important subclassD of coherent sets of desirable options collects all the maximally informative, or maximal, ones:
The sets of desirable options inD are the undominated elements of the complete infimumsemilattice (D,⊆). Couso and Moral (2011) have proved the following elegant and useful characterisation of these maximal elements:
Proposition 12. Given any coherent set of desirable options D and any non-zero option u ∉ D , then posi(D ∪ {−u}) is a coherent set of desirable options. As a consequence, a coherent set of desirable options D is maximal if and only if
De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) have proved that the set of all coherent sets of desirable options is dually atomic, meaning that that any coherent set of desirable options D is the infimum of its non-empty set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable options: 
LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In this section, we embark on a more detailed study of lexicographic sets of desirable options, and amongst other things, explain where their name comes from. We will restrict ourselves here to the special case where V is the linear space L(X ) of all gambles on a finite possibility space X , provided with the component-wise order ≤ as its vector ordering.
We first show that the lower expectation functional associated with a lexicographic D is actually a linear prevision (Walley, 1991; . To get some feeling for what these lexicographic models represent, we first look at the special case of binary possibility spaces {a,b}, leading to a two-dimensional option space V = L({a,b}) provided with the point-wise order. It turns out that lexicographic sets of desirable options (gambles) are easy to characterise there, so we have a simple expression forD L .
Proposition 14. For any D inD L , the coherent lower prevision P D on L(X ) defined by
P D (f ) ∶= sup{µ ∈ R ∶ f − µ ∈ D } for all f in L(X )
Proposition 15. All lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the binary possi-
bility space {a,b} are given by (see also Figure 1 ):
where
for all ρ in (0,1).
Proof. We first observe that every set of desirable options inD L is coherent. Indeed, for any ρ in ( In the language of sets of desirable gambles (see for instance Quaeghebeur, 2014) , this means that in the binary case lexicographic sets of desirable gambles are either maximal or strictly desirable with respect to a linear prevision.
The lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the binary possibility space {a,b}, with ρ ∈ (0,1).
We now turn to the more general finite-dimensional case. Recall that a lexicographic order < L with ℓ ∈ N layers on a vector space V of finite dimension n is defined by
and denote, as usual, its reflexive version
A lexicographic probability system is an ℓ-tuple p ∶= (p 1 , . . . , p ℓ ) of probability mass functions on a possibility space X of cardinality n. We associate with this tuple p an expectation operator E p ∶= (E p 1 , . . . , E p ℓ ), and a (strict) preference relation ≺ p on L(X ), defined by:
We refer to work by Blume et al. (1991 ), Fishburn (1982 and Seidenfeld et al. (1990) for more details on generic lexicographic probability systems. The connection between lexicographic probability systems and sets of desirable gambles has also been studied by Cozman (2015) , and the connection with full conditional measures by Halpern (2010) and Hammond (1994) . Below, we first recall a number of relevant basic properties of lexicographic orders in Propositions 17 and 18. We then provide a characterisation of lexicographic sets of desirable gambles in terms of lexicographic orders in Theorem 20.
Remark that the reflexive version (Blume et al., 1991) .
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to lexicographic probability systems p that satisfy the following condition:
This condition requires that there should be no possible outcome in X that has zero probability in every layer. It is closely related to the notion of a Savage-null event (Savage, 1972 , Section 2.7):
The event ∅ is always Savage-null, and is called the trivial Savage-null event.
An important feature of preference relations ≺ p based on lexicographic probability systems is the incomparability relation ∥ p , defined by: f ∥ p g if and only if f ≺ p g and g ≺ p f for all f and g in L(X ). Since ⪯ p is a total order, it follows that
Finally, it also follows that Proof. For the direct implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p that satisfies Condition (15), and consider any non-empty event B ⊆ X . Consider any x in B, For the converse implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p and assume that Condition (15) does not hold. Then there is some x * in X such that p k (x * ) = 0 for all k in {1,... , ℓ}, and therefore Proof. This is a consequence of Equations (14), (16) and (17), taking into account that < L and ≤ L are transitive, and that < L is irreflexive.
We now link the lexicographic orderings ≺ p with the preference relation D based on desirability, given by Equation (10). We begin with an auxiliary result: 2 2 Except for the second statement, most of the items in this propositions are well-known (Quaeghebeur, 2014 , Section 1.4.1); we include a simple proof for completeness. 
Proof. It is clear from Proposition 17 that ≺ p is irreflexive and transitive. To show that
by Equation (10), and hence h − f = g − f +(h − g ) ∈ D , by Axiom D 4 . Using Equation (10) again, we find that then indeed f D h. Let us now prove the remaining statements.
(i) This follows from the definition of ≺ and the linearity of the expectation operator.
(ii) Assume that there are no non-trivial Savage-null events. Use Proposition 16 to infer that Condition (15) 
(iii) The first equivalence follows immediately from Equation (10), while the second is a consequence of the scaling axiom of coherent sets of desirable options.
Using Equation (10), we find that then indeed f D g .
Next we establish a link between lexicographic probability systems and preference relations associated with lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. We refer to papers by Cozman (2015, Section 2.1) and Seidenfeld et al. (1990) for other relevant discussion on the connection between lexicographic probabilities and partial preference relations. Our proof will make repeated use of the following separation theorem (Holmes, 1975) Two clarifications here are (i) that we will apply the theorem to linear subsets of L(X ), which is a linear topological space (Walley, 1991, Appendix D) that is finite-dimensional because X is finite, and (ii) that when the linear topological space is finite-dimensional, the assumption int(W 1 ) ≠ ∅ that Walley (1991, Appendix E1) mentions is not necessary for the separating hyperplane theorem to hold, as shown by Holmes (1975, Theorem 4B) .
Theorem 20. Given a lexicographic probability system p = (p 1 , . . . , p ℓ ) that has no nontrivial Savage-null events, the set of desirable gambles 
p . Since by assumption 0 ≺ p f and 0 ≺ p g , Equation (17) guarantees that
By the linearity of the expectation operator,
For the second statement, we consider any D inD L , and we construct a lexicographic probability system p with no non-trivial Savage-null events and such that ≺ p equals D . Define the real functional Λ 1 on L(X ) by letting 
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = ker Λ 1 , W 2 = D c ∩ ker Λ 1 and W 1 = cl(D ∩ ker Λ 1 ) (the topological closure of D ∩ ker Λ 1 in ker Λ 1 ); then int(W 1 ) ∩ W 2 = ∅ by Lemma 21, and 0 ∈ W 1 ∩W 2 ] ker Λ 2 is a n −2-dimensional linear space. Also, D ∩kerΛ 2 is either empty or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 2; otherwise, we repeat the same procedure again: it follows from Theorem 19 that there is some non-zero (continuous) linear functional Λ 3 on ker Λ 2 such that
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = ker Λ 2 , W 2 = D c ∩ ker Λ 2 and W 1 = cl(D ∩ ker Λ 2 ) (the topological closure of D ∩ ker Λ 2 in ker Λ 2 ); then int(W 1 ) ∩ W 2 = ∅ by Lemma 21, and 0 ∈ W 1 ∩ W 2 ] ker Λ 3 is a n − 3-dimensional linear space. Also, D ∩ ker Λ 3 is either empty or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 3; if not, continue in the same vein. This leads to successive linear functionals Λ k defined on the n −k +1-dimenional linear spaces ker Λ k−1 such that
This sequence stops as soon as D ∩ ker Λ k = ∅, and we then let ℓ ∶= k. Because the finite dimensions of the successive ker Λ k decrease with 1 at each step, we are guaranteed to stop after at most n repetitions: should D ∩kerΛ k ≠ ∅ for all k ∈ {1,... , n −1} then ker Λ n will be the 0-dimensional linear space {0}, and then necessarily D ∩ ker Λ n = ∅. For the last functional Λ ℓ , we have moreover that
To see this, recall that by construction
In this fashion we obtain ℓ linear functionals Λ 1 , . . . , Λ ℓ , each defined on the kernel of the previous functional-except for the domain L(X ) of Λ 1 . We now show that we can turn the Λ 2 , . . . , Λ ℓ into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear functionals on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ 2 , . . . , Γ ℓ to L(X ) from Lemma 22 below, and let Γ 1 ∶= Λ 1 . They satisfy Γ k (1) > 0 for all k ∈ {1,... , ℓ}; see Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals on L(X ) defined by E 1 ∶= Γ 1 , and
It is obvious from Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(i) that these linear functionals are normalised and positive, and therefore expectation operators on L(X ). Indeed each E k is the expectation operator associated with the mass function p k defined by p k (x) ∶= E k (I {x} ) for all x in X . In this way, p ∶= (p 1 , . . . , p ℓ ) defines a lexicographic probability system. We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 16. Assume ex absurdo that there is some
.. , ℓ}. Then I {x * } ∈ ker Γ 1 = ker Λ 1 and I {x * } ∈ Γ k for all k in {2,... , ℓ}. Invoke Lemma 22(iii) to find that I {x * } ∈ ker Λ 1 ∩ ker Γ 2 = ker Λ 2 . Repeated application of this same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that in I {x * } ∈ ker Λ ℓ−1 and I {x * } ∈ ker Λ ℓ . Since also I {x * } ∈ D and hence
It now only remains to prove that D is the lexicographic ordering with respect to this lexicographic probability system, or in other words that
For necessity, assume that f ∈ D . Then E 1 (f ) ≥ 0 by the definition of Λ 1 . If E 1 (f ) > 0, then we are done. So assume that E 1 (f ) = 0. Then f ∈ ker Λ 1 and Λ 2 (f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (18). Again, if Λ 2 (f ) > 0, we can invoke Lemma 22(iv) to find that Γ 2 (f ) > 0 and hence E 2 (f ) > 0, and we are done. So assume that Λ 2 (f ) = 0. Then f ∈ ker Λ 2 and Λ 3 (f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (18). We can go on in this way, and we call k the largest number for which E j (f ) = 0 for all j in {1,... , k − 1}, or in other words, the smallest number for which E k (f ) > 0. Then k ≤ ℓ by construction-see Equation (19)
For sufficiency, assume that 0 < L (E 1 (f ),... , E ℓ (f )), meaning that there is some k in {1,... , ℓ} for which E j (f ) = 0 = Γ j (f ) for all j in {1,... , k − 1} and E k (f ) > 0, whence also Γ k (f ) > 0. So f ∈ ker Γ j for all j ∈ {1,... , k − 1} and therefore repeated application of Lemma 22(iii) tells us that f ∈ ker Λ j for all j ∈ {1,... , k − 1}. Since Γ k (f ) > 0, we infer from Lemma 22(iv) that also Λ k (f ) > 0, whence indeed f ∈ D by Equation (18). To show that, we will use the fact that D , and therefore also cl(D ), is a convex set. Since the interior of a convex set is always included in the relative interior ri of that convex set (see Brøndsted, 1983 , Section 1.3), we find that int(cl(D )) ⊆ ri(cl(D )). A well-known result (Brøndsted, 1983, Theorem 3.4(d) ) states that ri(cl(C )) = ri(C ) for any convex set C in a finite-dimensional vector space, 
Proof. Fix any k in {2,... , ℓ}. Since the real functional Λ k on the n − k + 1-dimensional real vector space ker Λ k−1 is non-zero, there is some h k in ker
We will consider the quotient space L(X ) ker Λ k , a k-dimensional vector space whose elements f ker Λ k = f + ker Λ k are the affine subspaces through f , parallel to the subspace ker Λ k , for f ∈ L(X ). We first show that it follows from Theorem 19 that there is a non-zero linear functionalΓ k on L(X ) ker Λ k such that (20) where we let X k ∶= {x ∈ X ∶ I {x} ∉ ker Λ k } ⊆ X . The set X k is non-empty: since ker Λ k is n − k-dimensional, at most n − k of the linearly independent indicators I {x} , x ∈ X may lie in ker Λ k , so X k ≥ k. To show that we can apply Theorem 19, we prove that the condition for it is satisfied: ∑ 
There are now a number of possibilities. The first is that λ = 0, whence X
Since all I {x} ≻ 0 and Λ 1 is positive, we find that I {x} ∈ ker Λ 1 = domΛ 2 for all x in X ′ k . This in turn allows us to conclude that 0
and Λ 2 is positive, we find that I {x} ∈ ker Λ 2 = dom Λ 3 for all x in X ′ k . We can go on in this way until we eventually conclude that 0
The second possibility is that λ > 0. If now X
Since all I {x} ≻ 0 and Λ 2 is positive, we find that I {x} ∈ ker Λ 2 = domΛ 3 for all x in X ′ k . We can go on in this way until we eventually conclude
Since all I {x} ≻ 0 and Λ k−1 is positive, we find that I {x} ∈ ker Λ k−1 = domΛ k for all x in X ′ k . This now allows us to rewrite
Since all I {x} ≻ 0 and Λ k is positive, this implies that λΛ k (h k ) ≤ 0, a contradiction. We conclude that, indeed, there is a non-zero linear functionalΓ k on L(X ) ker Λ k that satisfies Equation (20) .
We now define the new real linear functional Γ k on L(X ) by letting
Observe that, since f = ∑ x∈X f (x)I {x} , this leads to
where the second equality follows from I {x} ∈ ker Λ k , and therefore I {x} ker Λ k = 0, for all x ∈ X ∖X k . If we also take into account Equation (20), this proves in particular that (i) and (ii) hold.
For the rest of the proof, consider any f in ker
Substituting back for λ, we get the equality: (20)], we see that Γ k (f ) and Λ k (f ) are either both zero, both (strictly) positive, or both (strictly) negative. This proves (iii) and (iv).
We conclude that the sets of desirable options inD L are in a one-to-one correspondence with the lexicographic probability systems that have no non-trivial Savage-null events. This is, of course, the reason why we have called the coherent sets of desirable
Lexicographic probability systems can now also be related to specific types of choice functions, through Proposition 11: given a coherent set of desirable options D , the most Looking first at the most conservative coherent choice function that corresponds to D and then checking whether it is 'convex', leads rather restrictively to lexicographic choice functions, and is only possible for lexicographic D : convexity and choice based on Walley-Sen maximality are only compatible for lexicographic binary choice. But suppose we turn things around somewhat, first restrict our attention to all 'convex' coherent choice functions from the outset, and then look at the most conservative such choice function that makes the same binary choices as present in some given D :
inf{C ∈C ∶ C satisfies Axiom C 5 and D C = D }.
We infer from Proposition 3 that this infimum is still 'convex' and coherent. It will, of course, no longer be lexicographic, unless D is. The following proposition tells us it still is an infimum of lexicographic choice functions. 
Proof. Denote the choice function on the left-hand side by C left , and the one on the right-hand side by C right . Both are coherent, and so by Axiom C 4 b completely characterised by the option sets from which 0 is chosen. Consider any A in Q 0 , then we have to show that 0
For the direct implication, we assume that 0 ∈ C left ({0} ∪ A), meaning that there is some C * inC that satisfies Axiom C 5 , D C * = D and 0 ∈ C * ({0} ∪ A). We have to prove that there is some D * inD L such that D ⊆ D * and D * ∩ A = ∅ [by Proposition 10], and we will do so by constructing a suitable lexicographic probability system, by a repeated application of an appropriate version of the separating hyperplane theorem [Theorem 19] , as in the proof of Theorem 20.
To prepare for this, we prove that posi({0} ∪ A) ∩ D = ∅. Indeed, assume ex absurdo that posi({0}∪ A)∩D ≠ ∅, so there is some f ∈ D such that f ∈ posi({0}∪ A). Then there is some λ in R >0 such that g ∶= λf ∈ CH({0}∪ A).
by Proposition 10. Version (4) of Axiom C 3 a then guarantees that 0
It follows from this observation that we can apply Theorem 19 to show that there is some non-zero linear functional Λ 1 on L such that 
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = ker Λ 1 , W 2 = posi({0} ∪ A) ∩kerΛ 1 and
ker Λ 2 is a n − 2-dimensional linear space. As before, D ∩ ker Λ 2 is either empty or a nonempty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 2; otherwise, repeat the same procedure over and over again, leading to successive non-zero linear functionals Λ k on ker Λ k−1 such that
until eventually we get to the first k such that D ∩ker Λ k = ∅, and then let ℓ ∶= k and stop.
We are guaranteed to stop after at most n repetitions, since ker Λ n is the 0-dimensional linear space {0}, for which D ∩ ker Λ n = ∅. For the last functional Λ ℓ , we have that
In this fashion we obtain ℓ linear functionals Λ 1 , . . . , Λ ℓ , each defined on the kernel of the previous functional-except for the domain L(X ) of Λ 1 . We now show that we can turn the Λ 1 , . . . , Λ ℓ into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear functionals on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ 2 , . . . , Γ ℓ to L(X ) from Lemma 22, and let Γ 1 ∶= Λ 1 . They satisfy Γ k (1) > 0 for all k in {1,... , ℓ}; see Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals on L(X ) defined by E k (f ) ∶= Γ k (f ) Γ k (1) for all k in {1,... , ℓ} and f in L(X ). It is obvious from Lemma 22(i) that these linear functionals are normalised and positive, and therefore expectation operators on L(X ). Indeed each E k is the expectation operator associated with the mass function p k defined by p k (x) ∶= E k (I {x} ) for all x in X . In this way, p ∶= (p 1 , . . . , p ℓ ) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 16. Assume ex absurdo that there is some x * in X such that p k (x * ) = E k (I {x * } ) = 0 for all k in {1,... , ℓ}. Then I {x * } ∈ ker Γ 1 = ker Λ 1 and I {x * } ∈ Γ k for all k in {2,... , ℓ}. Invoke Lemma 22(iii) to find that I {x * } ∈ ker Λ 1 ∩ ker Γ 2 = ker Λ 2 . Repeated application of this same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that in I {x * } ∈ ker Λ ℓ−1 and I {x * } ∈ ker Λ ℓ . Since also I {x * } ∈ D and hence I {x * } ∈ D ∩ ker Λ ℓ−1 [Axiom D 2 ], Equation (23) implies that Λ ℓ (I {x * } ) > 0, a contradiction.
If we now let D * ∶= { f ∈ L(X ) ∶ 0 < L (E 1 (f ) Then Λ 1 (f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (21). If Λ 1 (f ) > 0 then also E 1 (f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and therefore f ∈ D * . If Λ 1 (f ) = 0 then Λ 2 (f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (22). If Λ 2 (f ) > 0 then also E 2 (f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∈ D * . We can go on in this way until we get to the first k for which Λ k (f ) > 0, and therefore also E k (f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), whence therefore f ∈ D * . We are guaranteed to find such a k because we infer from Equation (23) Secondly, consider any f in A. Then Λ 1 (f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (21). If Λ 1 (f ) < 0 then also E 1 (f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and therefore f ∉ D * . If Λ 1 (f ) = 0 then Λ 2 (f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (22). If Λ 2 (f ) < 0 then also E 2 (f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∉ D * . If we go on in this way, only two things can happen: either there is a first k for which Λ k (f ) < 0, and therefore also E k (f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), whence therefore f ∉ D * .
Or we find that Λ k (f ) ≤ 0, and therefore also E k (f ) ≤ 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), for all k ∈ {1,... , ℓ}, whence again f ∉ D * . This shows that indeed A ∩ D * = ∅.
For the converse implication, assume that 0 ∈ C right ({0} ∪ A). We must prove that there is someC inC that satisfies Axiom C 5 , DC = D and 0 ∈C({0} ∪ A). We claim that C ∶= C right does the job. Because we know by assumption that 0 ∈ C right ({0} ∪ A), and from Propositions 11 and 3 that C right is coherent and satisfies Axiom C 5 , it only remains to prove that D C right = D . To this end, consider any f in L(X ) and recall the following equivalences: 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
One of the advantages of lexicographic probability systems is that they are more informative than single probability measures, and that they allow us to deal with some of the issues that arise when conditioning on sets of probability zero. This is also the underlying idea behind some imprecise probability models, such as sets of desirable gambles. In this paper, we have investigated the connection between the two models, by means of the more general theory of coherent choice functions. We have shown that lexicographic probability systems correspond to the convexity axiom that was considered by Seidenfeld et al. when considering choice functions on horse lotteries. The study of this axiom has led to the consideration of what we have called lexicographic sets of desirable gambles.
In addition, we have also discussed the connection between our notion of coherent choice functions on abstract vectors, and the earlier notion for horse lotteries, developed mostly by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) . We have proved that by defining choice functions on arbitary vector spaces-something which also proves useful when studying the implications of an indifference assessment (Van Camp et al., 2017)-we can include choice functions on horse lotteries as a particular case. This allows us in particular to formulate our results for that framework. Note, nevertheless, that there are some differences between Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) approach and ours, due to the rationality axioms considered and also to the fact that they deal with possibly infinite (but closed) sets of options, whereas our model assumes that choices are always made between finite sets of alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which our results can be generalised to infinite option sets.
One of the advantages of Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) approach is that it leads to a representation theorem, in the sense that any coherent choice function can be obtained as the infimum of an arbitrary family of more informative convex coherent choice functions that essentially correspond to probability mass functions. Based on the results and conclusions derived here, it seems natural to wonder if a similar result can be established in our framework. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is negative: it turns out that in addition to convexity we need another axiom, which we have called weak Archimedeanity. With this extra axiom, at least for binary possibility spaces, it turns out a similar representation result can be proved: every such choice function is an infimum of its lexicographic dominating choice functions, showing the importance of a study of lexicographic choice functions also from another angle of perspective. The observation that we need an Archimedean axiom is in agreement with Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) need of their Archimedean axiom, which is--unlike our weak Archimedeanity-difficult to join with desirability. We intend to report on these results elsewhere.
On the other hand, we would also like to combine our results with the discussion by Van Camp et al. (2017) , and investigate indifference and conditioning for the special case of lexicographic choice functions. In particular, this should allow us to link our work with Blume et al.'s (1991) discussion of conditioning lexicographic probabilities. Finally, it may be interesting to generalise our results in Section 5 to lexicographic probability systems defined on infinite spaces.
